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A

FRIENDLY ADDRESS

TO THE

Members of the several Clubs,

IN THE

PARISH OF St. ANN, WESTMINSTER,

ASSOCIATED

FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING

A REFORM IN PARLIAMENT,

BY

WILLIAM KNOX, Esq.

LONDON:

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CARPENTER, BOND-STREET.

MDCXCIII.

P R E F A C E.

IN consequence of my having proposed the resolution for applying to the magistrates to take away the licences of such victuallers, in the parish of St. Ann, Westminster, as suffered seditious clubs to be held at their houses, which was unanimously agreed to by the parishioners, at their general meeting in November, to preserve the public tranquillity, I was soon after attended by some members of clubs, who met for the purpose of obtaining a reform of parliament, with a declaration of their attachment to the British constitution; and, at the same time, expressing their wish, that the right of election should be extended to all inhabitants who paid taxes, upon the principle that all who contributed to the support of government ought to have a share in its formation.

The arguments I then used to dissuade them from such a pursuit made so great an impression upon some of them, that they requested I would put my reasons upon paper, and give them to them to read in their clubs; which I accordingly did; and having since seen that the higher classes of reformers pursue nearly the same object with those to whom I addressed that paper, I conceive the publication of it, with such additions and alterations as a further consideration of the subject has suggested, may be of some utility, by exposing the absurdity of that novel and most unconstitutional doctrine, that the House of Commons is merely a house of delegates or representatives of the people, and bound as such to obey their instructions, which leads so directly to the establishment of democracy and anarchy.

A FRIENDLY ADDRESS, &c.

FELLOW CITIZENS,

As you have distinguished yourselves from the bands of levellers and republicans, who seek to overturn our happy constitution, and break down all the legal fences which protect our persons and properties from lawless insult and depredations, by professing yourselves attached to the form and substance of the British government, consisting of a supreme legislature, composed of king, lords, and commons; and a supreme executive authority residing in the king, and the magistrates appointed by or under him, and only mean to *widen the bottom* of the excellent fabric, by giving a larger share of power to the democratic part, and extending the right of *actual* representation in parliament to all who contribute to the support of the government, by the payment of taxes, and are now only *virtually* represented by members elected by others. I think you intitled to the best information I can give you, respecting the ob-

ject of your pursuit, and therefore, without blaming your purpose, or meaning to discourage you in the use of all proper means for obtaining it, to such extent, and in such modes, as, upon a candid consideration of all circumstances, shall be judged conducive to the public good, I would beg leave to ask you, if you have well considered the nature of the British constitution, and wherein it essentially differs from that which you seem to take for your model, which our neighbours, the French, profess to intend to establish? for they have, as yet, established nothing, having already had three different constitutions in four years, and are now governed by a convention, purposely elected to form another, to be called a Republic: but of what nature it is to be, neither themselves, nor any one else, can yet guess; and to assist you in the enquiry, I shall begin with briefly stating to you what I conceive the British constitution really is—

The original principle upon which the British constitution appears to have been founded, is, *That all who are attached to the country, by possessing a fixed property in it, which must rise or fall in value with the prosperity, or de-*

cay of the country, should have a share in the government; while those who have no permanent interest in its welfare should be excluded. In pursuance of this principle, the great landed men, who were called Barons, as possessing baronies, formed one branch of the legislature; and to this day no man can sit in the House of Lords who is not a baron, and possessed of a barony.—The bishops cannot take their seats there, until the king invests them with their temporalities or baronies. The lesser proprietors of lands being more numerous, could not all come to the meetings of the legislature, though all had an equal right to do so; and therefore they agreed to send *representatives*; and thus the knights of shires became elected by the freeholders of lands, as at this day. The foreign trade of England was anciently but little; and our exports were only wool and tin. The five towns of Dover, Sandwich, Rye, Winchelsea, and Hyth, sent out the former, and there were twenty-one towns in Cornwall which exported the latter. To encourage these, the king took them under his particular protection, and exempted them from the jurisdiction of the barons, by granting them charters, with powers to elect ma-

gistrates of their own, and for their greater security and encouragement, gave them a right to share in the legislature, by sending citizens or burgesses to parliament.

The same is the case with all other towns which send citizens or burgesses to parliament; they all do so by virtue of charters granted by the crown, for the encouragement of their trade, and exemption from the jurisdiction of the barons, each of whom claimed and exercised legal jurisdiction within their respective baronies. But although a new set of people, who were not freeholders by means of these charters, were made electors, still the fundamental principle, I before stated, of their *permanent interest* in the welfare of the country, was adhered to, for their members were required to have a property in lands to the amount of three hundred pounds per annum at least; and the charters did not give a right of suffrage to all the inhabitants of such corporations or boroughs without discrimination; but confined it to such as should be able to prove themselves to be in circumstances, which *implied* at least their having a *permanent interest* in the welfare of the place they voted for, and

consequently, in the general wellbeing of the nation : thus, for instance, in the city of London, the right of election is confined to the liverymen, as those who are free of the whole city are called. Now, in order to be free of the city, a man must be first free of some trading company in it; and in order to be free of a trading company, he must have served an apprenticeship to some freeman, or be the son of a freeman, by which you see his *fixed* and *permanent interest* in the welfare of the city is ascertained; and even in Westminster, bad as the state of election is in it, some regard is still paid to the principle of the electors having a *permanent interest* in its welfare; though as it was not considered as a trading town, but only as a royal residence, the proofs required of such *permanent interest* were much slighter than in London, in order to include such inhabitants as took up their abode there, on account of the employment the residence of the court, and great men afforded them. Hence, the renting a house, and paying the taxes for a year, was deemed a sufficient proof of interest in the welfare of Westminster, to entitle an inhabitant to vote in the election of a citizen or burghers to sit in parliament.

From this brief detail of the origin of the House of Commons, composed of knights of the shires, elected by the freeholders of the counties to *represent them*, and of citizens and burgeses, elected by certain inhabitants of incorporated towns, it appears evident, that the knights of the shires only can be properly denominated *representatives*; because they are elected or sent by the freeholders who have a right to seats themselves; for no man can properly be the *representative* of another, any further than his constituent has a right in himself to transfer to him. The sixteen peers of Scotland are the *representatives* of the Scotch peers; because, every peer that elects them had a right to sit in the Scotch house of peers, and they have consented to divolve that individual right upon sixteen *representatives* in the British parliament. But the citizens and burgeses have no claim to the title of *representatives*: for those by whom they are elected, neither have nor had any right to sit in parliament, and consequently cannot constitute representatives to sit there in their places. The king, by his charter, impowers two citizens or two burgeses of certain towns to sit in parliament with the knights

of the shires, and appointed certain descriptions of the inhabitants to elect them; not as the representatives of all the inhabitants, nor even of those by whom they are elected; for they having no right to seats themselves, cannot have any title to send representatives, but as the citizens or burgesses of such towns sent to parliament, from those towns to whom the king has granted a right to send citizens or burgesses to parliament.

The House of Commons is therefore not a House of Representatives; nor is it ever so styled in any legislative proceeding. Nor was it ever supposed to be such, until the advocates for the American rebellion broached the new-fangled, but mischievous, doctrine, of the right of imposing taxes being dependant upon representation. The absurdity of such doctrine, and its repugnance to the British constitution, I so fully exposed in my *Review of the American Controversy*, published in 1768, and lately republished by Debrett, that none of its advocates dared to answer me; and as I had then the assistance of as able a statesman and warm a friend to British liberty, as ever this country produced, the late Mr. G. Grenville, I shall here quote from

that pamphlet the part of the argument which was furnished by him. “ This doctrine, that
 “ taxation and representation upon the true
 “ principles of government must go together, is
 “ so well calculated to *captivate the multitude*
 “ *in this country*, and so flattering to the Ame-
 “ ricans, as it entirely abrogates the authority
 “ of parliament to tax the colonies, that it is
 “ not surprising it has found partizans in
 “ Great Britain, and has been universally
 “ adopted in America, without much enquiry
 “ or examination into its foundation in reason
 “ or fact; and yet, if it be applied, as in the
 “ instance before us, to an *actual* or *distinct*
 “ representation of all those who are taxed,
 “ and no other will serve the purpose of the
 “ colonies, it is not true of any government
 “ now existing; nor, I believe, of any which
 “ ever did exist. In that sense, it neither is, nor
 “ ever was true in Great Britain. It is not true
 “ in any of the charter or royal governments
 “ in America. It is not true in the province
 “ of Massachusset’s Bay, in which, by the last
 “ history of it, there appears not only to be
 “ a multitude of individuals, but even forty
 “ townships of freeholders now taxed, who
 “ have no distinct representatives; so far there-

“ fore is this doctrine of distinct representa-
 “ tion and taxation, from *going together, being*
 “ *joined by God himself, founded in the eter-*
 “ *nal law of nature, having grown up with*
 “ *the constitution of England, that it never*
 “ existed neither in England nor in any other
 “ country in the world. The origin of parli-
 “ aments in England lies hid in the obscu-
 “ rity of antiquity; we only know that antece-
 “ dent to the times which our histories run
 “ back to, the great men of the realm, who
 “ held their lands in capite from the crown, to-
 “ gether with the king, composed the supreme
 “ legislature. The *consent* therefore of those
 “ who held their lands of the crown was neces-
 “ sary, from time immemorial, to give being to
 “ every law by which the people of England
 “ were bound; but it cannot be said that these
 “ tenants in capite were then the representa-
 “ tives of the *people* of England, in any other
 “ sense of the term, than the Lords of Parlia-
 “ ment may now be said to be their represen-
 “ tatives. And when, from the frequent forfei-
 “ tures of the great tenants, and the parcel-
 “ ling out of lands among the successive king’s
 “ favourites; from the granting away the pa-

“ trimony of the crown to fundry individuals,
 “ and from a variety of other causes, the te-
 “ nants in capite became too numerous for all
 “ to assemble in parliament, and many of
 “ them were too poor to bear the charge of
 “ an attendance there, the *device* of sending
 “ a few of their body, as *representatives* of
 “ the whole of these lesser tenants, was hit
 “ upon; yet still these deputies of the lesser
 “ tenants were not the distinct representatives
 “ of the *people* of England; for they distinctly
 “ represented those only who in themselves
 “ had a right to a share in the legislature, and
 “ by whom they were deputed or elected.
 “ Nor are the members sent to parliament by
 “ boroughs and corporations, more properly
 “ the distinct representatives of the people of
 “ Great Britain, than are the knights of the
 “ shires. All the corporations and boroughs,
 “ who elect members for parliament, do it by
 “ virtue of a charter for that purpose, from
 “ the crown, or by prescription, which, in law,
 “ presupposes a grant, or charter, beyond time
 “ of memory. The kings of England, for
 “ many centuries, constantly exercised the
 “ right of creating corporations with the power
 “ of sending members to parliament, and vest-

“ ed that power in many, or in a few, at their
 “ discretion : some of these, particularly the
 “ two universities, were incorporated for that
 “ purpose, so late as the reign of James the
 “ First; and unless it be restrained by the act of
 “ union of the two kingdoms, I do not know
 “ that this power has ever been taken away.
 “ It is, moreover, worthy of remark, that these
 “ members, sent to parliament by the free-
 “ holders of counties and corporations and
 “ boroughs, are not called *Representatives of*
 “ *the people*, but the *Commons in Parliament*.
 “ They are so styled in all the old writs and
 “ records : they are so styled, to this day, in
 “ every act of parliament; and they act not
 “ only for their own particular communities,
 “ by whom they are severally elected, but
 “ each of them for the community of the
 “ whole*. The subjects of Great Britain are

* In further proof of this assertion, I have annexed the pre-
 ambles to the acts for granting members to the counties pa-
 latine of Durham and Chester, when they became incorpo-
 rated in the kingdom ; and also the clause of the act for in-
 corporating Wales, which impowers the counties and bo-
 roughs to send members to parliament ; which are the only
 acts of parliament by which members have been given to
 any county or borough.

“ not, however, without *their representatives*,
 “ though the members who compose the
 “ House of Commons cannot be said to be
 “ distinctly so. Neither are they bound by
 “ laws, nor is their money taken from them
 “ *without their own consent given by their re-*
 “ *presentatives. The king, lords and com-*
 “ *mons TOGETHER, are their representatives;*
 “ *for to them it is that they have delegated*
 “ *their individual rights;* and so long as
 “ they approve of that form of government,
 “ and continue under it, so long do they *con-*
 “ *sent* to whatever is done by those they have
 “ entrusted with their rights.” Thus far you
 have Mr. Grenville’s opinion in his own
 words; and I will add to it, the opinions of
 the learned Hooker, and the great Locke, as
 quoted in the same pamphlet, in confirmation
 of it. “ Laws they are not,” says Hooker,
 “ which public approbation hath not made
 “ so. But approbation not only they give,
 “ who personally declare their assent by voice,
 “ sign, or act, but also when others do it in
 “ their names by right, originally, at the least,
 “ derived from them. And to be commanded
 “ *we do consent*, when that *society, whereof*
 “ *we are part*, hath at any time before con-

“ *sent*ed, without revoking the same after, by
 “ the *like universal agreement*. And Mr.
 “ Locke, who followed this learned investi-
 “ gator of the rights of mankind, in his an-
 “ swer to sir Robert Filmer, after having
 “ shewn that the origin of all power is from
 “ the people only; that every form of go-
 “ vernment, whether a democracy, an oligar-
 “ chy, an elective or hereditary monarchy, is
 “ nothing more than a trust delegated by the
 “ society to the person or persons so appoint-
 “ ed, lays it down as a fundamental maxim
 “ in all governments, that the legislative is the
 “ joint power of every member of the so-
 “ ciety given up to that person, or assembly,
 “ which is legislator. And that even the ex-
 “ ecutive, though vested in a single person, is
 “ to be considered as the representative of the
 “ commonwealth; and he then adds, Nobody
 “ doubts but an express consent of any man
 “ entering into society, makes him a perfect
 “ member of that society, a subject of that go-
 “ vernment. The difficulty is, what ought to
 “ be looked upon as a *tacit* consent; and to this
 “ I say, That *every man that hath any possessions*
 “ *or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of*
 “ *any government, doth thereby give his tacit*

" consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it."

None of these great advocates for the rights of the people, and champions of British liberty, you see, ever supposed that it was essential to a free constitution, that the members who composed the Supreme Legislature should be elected by the general suffrage of the whole community, or that each individual should have a distinct or personal representative therein; nor, indeed, was the idea of the House of Commons, being the distinct representative of the people at large, ever entertained by any sensible Englishman, until, as I before observed, the unfortunate contest with America led some respectable characters to promulge the absurd doctrine, in justification of the colonies resisting the authority of parliament: but even these champions of the independency of the colonies did not contend for a right of individual or personal representation, or universal suffrage in the whole people. That foundation of anarchy was reserved to be laid by the French philosophers; and I think you will not be so fond of their superstructure, as to be de-

firous to pull down your own, in order to raise one after its model.

As I have now shewn you what the British constitution really is, and that the legislature, consisting of king, lords and commons, is the *representative* of the whole British community, I shall proceed to the consideration of your proposition of increasing the democratic influence, by extending the right of suffrage to certain descriptions of non-electors, and thereby widening the bottom of the constitutional pyramid, and strengthening and supporting the fabric.

It is true, that, consistent with the principle of a *permanent interest in the public welfare*, which I have shewn to be essentially connected with the right of suffrage, as well as with that of legislating, a considerable addition might be made to the number of members in the House of Commons, and a vast increase in the number of the electors; for it is evident to all men, that the number of inhabitants, so qualified, is greatly augmented since the union of the two kingdoms. But in extending franchises to others, care must be taken, that the rights of

the original proprietors be not injured, as when a charter for a new market is applied for, a writ of *ad quod damnum* is always issued, and *non damnum* certified before it is granted; and therefore it is proper to examine the several modes which have been proposed of extending this right of suffrage. The first is, that of opening all charters of cities and boroughs, and giving to every inhabitant, as is the case in Westminster, a right to vote. Now, before we proceed to examine the *justice* of this mode, let us ask the proposers of it, if they wish to see elections for London, Bristol, Norwich, York, Liverpool, and the other great towns, carried on in the *same manner* as we have seen those for Westminster? I mean no reflection upon any candidate or party; but I appeal to your own good sense and knowledge of facts for justifying my assertion, that all the riots, perjuries, and murders, which the elections in Westminster have occasioned, were owing to the *lowness of the qualification which gives a right to vote*; and that the only way to remedy the evil, is the *raising the qualification*, so as to *confine* the right of voting to the respectable inhabitants. Charters, I know, are represented by specula-

tive politicians, as great impediments to trade, and injurious to the places to which they were granted: but those gentlemen must give me leave to say, they reason unfairly, when they take the present state of this favoured country for the ground of their argument, without adverting to what was its state when the charters I have before spoken of were granted. We now see nothing of the civil and criminal, and military jurisdiction, which the barons then exercised over their tenants, the king and parliament having happily annihilated it; but if it be recollected what it was in those times, I shall not be thought too bold in asserting in my turn, that, without the grant of charters by the king, which exempted the inhabitants from such jurisdiction, England would never have enjoyed any considerable trade, either in those towns, or any where else: and if we enquire into the causes which have retarded the progress of trade and the manufactures in Scotland and Wales, we shall find them to be the remnant of the feudal power, claimed and exercised by their lords or barons, and the want of charters to protect the inhabitants, and enable them to make rules for their own government. Char-

tered rights ought therefore to be, as they have hitherto been, highly respected, and tenderly dealt with. But the injustice and unreasonableness of the proposition of opening charters, and extending the right of election to all the inhabitants of cities and corporations, will appear more evidently from a simple statement of the case, and I will take the city of London for the instance, by whose charter, as I have already shewn, the right of electing members to parliament is vested in the liverymen. Under this charter the city of London has increased in trade and opulence beyond what was ever known of any other city in the world; but the liverymen, though now amounting to about eight thousand, have not increased equally with the other inhabitants, who may now be supposed to amount to two hundred thousand, who have no share in the government of the city, or right to vote in the election of its members. These two hundred thousand, therefore, say to the eight thousand liverymen, we desire equal rights with you, as we pay all taxes equally with you, and it is unreasonable and unequal, that eight thousand should chuse the members for two hundred thousand: but may not the liverymen fairly

answer, you knew what the constitution of our city was when you came to reside in it, and you were induced to come on account of the advantages you expected to enjoy under that constitution, which has preserved such good order, and given such protection to persons and property, that the trade and opulence of the inhabitants have risen to their present amazing height; and in this prosperity you have had your full share, and you have been allowed peaceably to enjoy all the advantages you expected when you came to reside among us, for we have done nothing against you; it is not therefore a very proper return for our probity and kindness, to ask us to give up our rights of election to you, which would be the case if your two hundred thousand were to vote for our members, as our eight thousand votes would then be as nothing against your two hundred thousand: and why should we alter the constitution of our city, seeing you yourselves have proved its excellence, by the great increase of your numbers, and the vast amount of your riches acquired under it? Apply for members for yourselves, if you think fit; but don't ask us to give you up ours.—What I have said upon this head, will, I am

persuaded, fully satisfy you, that the mode of opening charters ought not to be generally adopted: and the same train of reasoning will equally serve to shew that the right of the freeholders to elect knights of the shires ought not to be broken in upon, much less taken away, by extending the right of election to all inhabitants who pay taxes. To do either would be to alter the constitution, not to reform it; for reforming it implies the restoring it to its primitive state, by the correction of abuses. Whereas I have shewn, that those to whom you want to give a right of elective suffrage, *never had it, nor can possess it, consistently with the principles upon which the constitution is founded.* If, indeed, you mean to contend, that the constitution is imperfect, and that the extension of the right of elective suffrage, in the manner you propose, would be an improvement, that is quite another ground of debate, and opens a wide field of discussion: I will not, however, enter upon it at present, any further than to say to you, what I did to a great minister, who asked me, if I did not think it would have been better for this country if the navigation laws had not been carried into strict execution? That in the last

war Great Britain had put forth a naval force beyond what the world had ever seen. That she had, at the same time, a greater number of ships employed as transports, victuallers, and store-ships, than had ever been employed by any nation. That she carried on a greater trade at the same time, than ever she had done before; and that all this had arisen under the navigation laws. How much better things might have been, if there had been no such laws, or they had been less strictly executed, I could not pretend to say; but the present state satisfied me; and when I saw things prospering so well, under the present mode, I did not think it prudent to risk a change. But however averse I am to alterations of the constitution, I am by no means an enemy to the correction of such abuses as may have crept in by length of time, or change of manners, or to the restoration of such rights as may have been inadvertently surrendered, or fraudulently taken away.

The prerogative of the crown, to grant charters of incorporation, with the right to send citizens or burghesses to parliament, was highly beneficial to the democratic part of the con-

stitution, inasmuch as it was not only the means of taking the inhabitants of towns out of the jurisdiction of the barons, while they had any jurisdiction, but of balancing their weight in the legislature. It served too to preserve that essential principle of the constitution, that the elective franchise should be attached to the permanent property of the kingdom, from losing its influence through the increase of the wealthy inhabitants in the formerly unimproved parts of the kingdom, and the enlargement of villages into great and populous towns, by following such increase of wealthy inhabitants, with the grant of the elective franchise. The reasons which induced the crown to give to certain inhabitants of Salisbury, and other newly grown-up great towns, a right to send citizens or burgesses to parliament, are now equally cogent, for making the like grants to certain of the inhabitants of Birmingham, Manchester, and Sheffield; and the opulent inhabitants of those towns have the same claim to a share in the legislature with any of the former. If, therefore, that prerogative be extinguished by the act of union, it ought to be revived by act of parliament, or at least, parliament ought to

do what the crown formerly did, in order to preserve the fundamental principle of the constitution in vigor.

The objection that the House of Commons would, by this means, become too numerous for business, ought not to have any weight, where the principles of the constitution are involved in the consideration; and, besides, the fact is not so; for how often do we see the public business retarded for want of a sufficient number of members attending in their places; and if it were otherways, and the present chamber was too small to admit a greater number, it would surely be better to go to the expence of erecting a larger house, than to suffer the first principle of the constitution to lose its efficacy. In respect to the knights of the shires, the *representatives* of the freeholders, although the number of their constituents is much increased by the division of freeholds, I do not think that circumstance gives them any right to an additional number of representatives; because, the foundation of their right to send representative is not altered. In the cases of the palatinates of Chester and Durham, when they

were made English counties by act of parliament, the freeholders were declared entitled to send representatives; and if it should be judged fit to increase the number of knights in the House of Commons, the same power which incorporated those counties, can divide such as are too large for convenience, and by giving each division separate representatives, make the whole representation more equal. Thus, for instance, if an act of parliament should make each riding of Yorkshire a separate county, and empower the freeholders in each to send two knights, the proportion between the representation of the freeholders of Yorkshire and Rutlandshire would be rendered more equal. But in whatever respects the representation of the freeholders, the utmost care should be taken not to admit any right in their representatives, to destroy or abridge their franchise; for upon the inherent undefeasible right of the freeholders of England to sit in parliament, either themselves, or by knights elected by them, as their representatives, rests the whole fabric of our excellent constitution; and, therefore, an act which deprives any description of legal freeholders of their right to

elect without imputing to them any crime or act of forfeiture, ought to be universally reprobated by all the freeholders of the kingdom, as an assumption of power in the representatives, to determine who should be their constituents. The pretence of diminishing the influence of the crown, has always been the bait thrown out to lure the people to enlarge the power of popular demagogues; but as the great and distinguishing characteristic of our government is the due balance of the three estates of which it consists, every Englishman ought to bear in mind that the subjugation of either to the others, destroys that balance, and overturns the government.

That no king has ever been able to govern this country without a parliament; but, that an House of Commons has destroyed both king and lords, and established a government without either.

The modes I have suggested, of adding citizens or burgesses, and increasing the number of knights of shires, pursue the line of the constitution, and are perfectly consonant to its fun-

damental principles, and correspond with ancient practice, and may therefore be safely adopted. They would occasion no commotions or discontents, for although they would benefit many, they would make no innovations, nor trench upon any rights which ought to be held sacred, and could not, therefore, excite opposition, nor give any good subject offence; and I should hope, that all who really mean the strengthening the constitution, by extending the elective franchise, or, as you term it, widening the bottom of the pyramid, would be satisfied, and the wishes of none other ought to be gratified. But, as in order to obtain such extention, the most respectable applications should be made to the legislature, let me earnestly exhort you, to avoid every appearance of tumult or faction, and to hold no meetings, or form any associations, which may create disturbances, or excite apprehensions of them; but exert yourselves, and employ your influence over those connected with you, to preserve the public peace in all places, and upon all occasions; and by so doing give testimony of your duty and allegiance to the king, your reverence

and submission to the laws, and your attachment to the constitution, in which you will meet with the hearty concurrence of your fellow-citizen,

WILLIAM KNOX.

SOHO-SQUARE,

DECEMBER, 1792.

26 HENRY VIII.

Concerning the laws to be used in Wales.

“ AND be it further enacted, that for this pre-
“ sent parliament, and all other parliaments, to
“ be holden and kept for this realm, two knights
“ shall be chosen, and elected to the same par-
“ liament, for the shire of Monmouth, and
“ one burgess for the borough of Monmouth,
“ in like manner, form and order, as knights
“ and burgesses of the parliament be elected,
“ and chosen in all other shires of this realm
“ of England; and that the same knights and
“ burgesses shall have like dignity, pre-emi-
“ nence, and privilege, and shall be allowed
“ such fees as other knights and burgesses of
“ the parliament have been allowed.” And so
for all the other shires and boroughs.

*An act for making of knights and bur-
gesses within the county and city of
Chester.*

The 34 and 35 HENRY VIII.

“ To the king our sovereign Lord, in most
“ humble wise shewn unto your most excellent
“ Majesty, the inhabitants of your Grace’s
“ county palatine of Chester, That where the
“ said county palatine of Chester is, and hath
“ been always hitherto exempt, excluded, and
“ separated out and from your high court of
“ parliament, to have any knights and burgeses
“ within the said court; by reason whereof
“ the said inhabitants have hitherto sustained
“ manifold disherifons, losses, and damages,
“ as well in their lands, goods, and bodies, as
“ in the good, civil, and politic governance
“ and maintenance of the commonwealth of
“ their said county. And, forasmuch, as the
“ inhabitants have always hitherto been bound

“ by the acts and statutes made and ordained
 “ by your said Highness and your most noble
 “ progenitors, by authority of the said court,
 “ as far forth as other counties, cities, and
 “ boroughs have been, that have had their
 “ knights and burgesses within your said court
 “ of parliament, and yet have had neither
 “ knight nor burgess there, for the said coun-
 “ ty palatine, the said inhabitants, for lack
 “ thereof, have been oftentimes taiched and
 “ grieved with acts and statutes made within
 “ the said court, as well derogatory unto the
 “ most ancient jurisdictions, liberties, and pri-
 “ vileges of your said county palatine, as
 “ prejudicial unto the commonwealth, quiet-
 “ ness, rest, and peace, of your Grace’s most
 “ bounden subjects, inhabiting within the same;
 “ for remedy whereof, it may please your said
 “ Highness, that it may be enacted, with the
 “ assent of the lords, spiritual and temporal,
 “ and the commons, in this present parliament
 “ assembled, and by the authority of the same,
 “ that from the end of this present session, the
 “ said county palatine Chester shall have two
 “ knights for the said county palatine, and
 “ likewise two citizens, to be burgesses for the
 “ city of Chester, to be elected and chosen by

“ process, to be awarded by the chancellor of
 “ England, unto the chamberlain of Chester,
 “ his lieutenant and deputy for the time being;
 “ and also like process to be made by the said
 “ chamberlain, his lieutenant, or deputy, to the
 “ sheriff of the said county of Chester, and the
 “ same election to be made under like manner
 “ and form, to all intents and constructions and
 “ purposes, as is used within the county pala-
 “ tine of Lancaster, or any other county and
 “ city within this realm of England; which
 “ said knights and burgessees, and every of
 “ them, so elected and chosen, shall be returned
 “ by the said sheriff into the chancery of Eng-
 “ land, in due form and upon like pain, as it is
 “ ordained, that the sheriff or sheriffs of any
 “ other county within this realm, should make
 “ their return in like case; and which said
 “ knights and burgessees, and every of them, so
 “ elected and returned, shall be knights and
 “ burgessees of the court of parliament, and have
 “ like voice and authority to all intents and pur-
 “ poses as any other the knights and burgessees
 “ of the said court of parliament have use and
 “ enjoy, and in likewise shall and may take
 “ all and every such liberties, advantages, dig-

"nities, privileges, wages, fees, and commodi-
ties, concerning this said court of parliament,
to all intents, constructions, and purpesses,
as any other the knights and burgeses of the
said court shall, may, or ought to have, take,
or enjoy."

25 CHARLES II.

*An act to enable the county palatine of
Durham to send knights and burgesses
to serve in parliament.*

“ WHEREAS the inhabitants of the county
“ palatine of Durham have not hitherto had
“ the liberty and privilege of electing and
“ sending any knights and burgesses to the
“ high court of parliament, although the in-
“ habitants of the said county palatine are
“ liable to all payments, rates, and subsidies,
“ granted by parliament, equally with the in-
“ habitants of other counties, cities, and bo-
“ roughs in this kingdom, who have their
“ knights and burgesses in the parliament, and
“ are therefore concerned equally with others,
“ the inhabitants of this kingdom, to have
“ knights and burgesses in the said high court
“ of parliament, of their own election, *to re-*
“ *present the condition of their country,* as
“ the inhabitants of other counties, cities, and
“ boroughs of this kingdom have. Wherefore,

“ may it please your Majesty, that it may be
 “ enacted, and be it enacted, by the King’s most
 “ excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
 “ and assent of the lords spiritual and tempo-
 “ ral, and the commons in the present parlia-
 “ ment assembled, and by the authority of the
 “ same, that from time to time, and at all times,
 “ from and after the end of this present session
 “ of parliament, the said county palatine of
 “ Durham may have two knights for the same
 “ county, and the city of Durham two citizens,
 “ to be burgessees for the said city for ever
 “ hereafter, to serve in the high court of par-
 “ liament, to be elected and chosen by virtue
 “ of your Majesty’s writ, to be awarded by the
 “ lord chancellor, or lord keeper of the great
 “ seal of England for the time being, in that
 “ behalf to the lord bishop of Durham, or his
 “ temporal chancellor of the said county of
 “ Durham, and a precept to be thereupon
 “ grounded and made by the said bishop of
 “ Durham, or his temporal chancellor for the
 “ time being, to the sheriff of the said county
 “ for the time being; and the same election,
 “ from time to time, to be made in manner
 “ and form following; that is to say, the electi-
 “ ons of the knights to serve for the said

“ county palantine, from time to time, here-
 “ after to be made by the greater number of
 “ freeholders of the said county palatine of
 “ Durham, which, from time to time, shall be
 “ present at such elections, accordingly as is
 “ used in other counties in this your Majesty’s
 “ kingdom; and that the election of the said
 “ burgesses, from time to time, to serve in the
 “ high court of parliament for the city of
 “ Durham, to be made, from time to time,
 “ by the major part of the mayor, aldermen,
 “ and freemen of the said city of Durham,
 “ which, from time to time, shall be present at
 “ such elections; which said knights and bur-
 “ gesses, and every of them, so elected or re-
 “ turned, shall be returned by the said sheriff
 “ into the chancery of England, in due form,
 “ and upon the like pains as be ordained for the
 “ sheriff or sheriffs of any other county in this
 “ kingdom, to make his or their return in like
 “ cases; and that the said knights and bur-
 “ gesses, and every of them, so elected or re-
 “ turned, shall be, by authority of this present
 “ act, knights and burgesses of the high court
 “ of parliament, to all intents and purposes,
 “ and have and use the like voice, authority,
 “ and places therein, to all intents and pur-

" poses, as any other the knights and burgessees
 " of the said high court of parliament have,
 " use, and enjoy; and likewise shall and may,
 " by virtue of this present act, take, have, use,
 " and enjoy all such and the like liberties, ad-
 " vantages, dignities, and privileges, concern-
 " ing the said court of parliament, to all in-
 " tents, constructions, and purposes, as any
 " other the knights and burgessees of the said
 " high court of parliament have taken, had,
 " used or enjoyed, or shall, may, or ought
 " hereafter to have, use, and enjoy."

F I N I S.

